We add branching time to the linear discrete event calculus, which yields a formalism for commonsense reasoning that combines the benefits of the situation calculus and the event calculus. We characterize the precise relationship between the linear and branching versions of the discrete event calculus, and prove that a restricted version of the branching discrete event calculus is equivalent to the situation calculus. We show how the branching discrete event calculus can be used to solve commonsense reasoning problems involving hypothetical events, concurrent events with cumulative and canceling effects, and triggered events.
Introduction
The classical logic event calculus (Miller & Shanahan, 2002; Shanahan, 1997) can serve as a foundation for commonsense reasoning. It can be used to reason about important areas of the commonsense world including action and change (Shanahan, 1999a) , space (Morgenstern, 2001; Shanahan, 1996 Shanahan, , 2004 , and mental states (Mueller, 2006a ). An important aspect of commonsense reasoning is reasoning about hypothetical events. Unlike the situation calculus (McCarthy, 1963; McCarthy & Hayes, 1969) , the classical logic event calculus typically uses a linear time structure (Miller & Shanahan, 2002, p. 453) and does not handle hypothetical events (Shanahan, 1997, p. 364) .
In this paper, we show how a version of the classical logic event calculus can be modified to yield a new formalism that combines the benefits of the situation calculus and the event calculus. Like the situation calculus, the new formalism supports reasoning about hypothetical events. Like the classical logic event calculus, the new formalism supports reasoning about the commonsense law of inertia, release from the commonsense law of inertia, concurrent events with cumulative and canceling effects, context-sensitive effects, indirect effects, nondeterministic effects, preconditions, and triggered events.
We start with the linear discrete event calculus (LDEC) (Mueller, 2004a (Mueller, , 2006a , a discrete version of the classical logic event calculus. LDEC has been proved logically equivalent to the continuous event calculus for integer time (Mueller, 2004a) , and to temporal action logics (Doherty, Gustafsson, Karlsson, & Kvarnström, 1998) for inertial fluents and single-step actions (Mueller, 2006b) . We modify LDEC to obtain the branching discrete event calculus (BDEC) by (1) removing the requirement that every situation must have a unique successor, and (2) adding an argument for successor situation to Happens, Initiates, Terminates, and Releases. We characterize the precise relationship between LDEC and BDEC, and prove that a restricted version of BDEC is equivalent to the situation calculus. We show how BDEC can be used to solve commonsense reasoning problems involving hypothetical events, concurrent events, and triggered events. We extend BDEC to distinguish between hypothetical and actual situations and events.
The discrete event calculus was developed to facilitate automated event calculus reasoning. It simplifies the classical logic event calculus axioms, reducing the number of axioms from 17 to 12 and eliminating triply quantified time from most axioms. The discrete event calculus is the basis for the Discrete Event Calculus Reasoner program for automated commonsense reasoning (Mueller, 2004b) . 1 We have implemented BDEC within this program, extending it with the ability to reason about hypothetical events.
Linear discrete event calculus
We use many-sorted languages with equality. The linear discrete event calculus has sorts for events, fluents, and situations. We use a version of the linear discrete event calculus without gradual change, and with an axiomatization of the nonnegative integers. The language has the constant S 0 denoting the initial situation, the function S L (s), which denotes the unique successor of situation s, and the following predicates:
• Happens L (e, s): Event e occurs at situation s.
• HoldsAt(f, s): Fluent f is true at situation s.
• ReleasedAt(f, s): Fluent f is released from the commonsense law of inertia at situation s.
• Initiates L (e, f, s): If event e occurs at situation s, then fluent f will be true and not released from the commonsense law of inertia at the successor of s.
• Terminates L (e, f, s): If event e occurs at situation s, then fluent f will be false and not released from the commonsense law of inertia at the successor of s.
• Releases L (e, f, s): If event e occurs at situation s, then fluent f will be released from the commonsense law of inertia at the successor of s.
The commonsense law of inertia (Lifschitz, 1987; Shanahan, 1997) states that a fluent's truth value persists unless the fluent is affected by an event. When a fluent is released from this law, its truth value can fluctuate. Fluents that are released from the commonsense law of inertia can be used to model nondeterministic effects (Shanahan, 1999a) and indirect effects (Shanahan, 1999b) . Let LDEC be the conjunction of the following axioms:
Axioms LDEC1 through LDEC3 are the Peano axioms for the nonnegative integers. Axiom LDEC3 is a second-order axiom of induction.
Branching discrete event calculus
We extend LDEC to branching time as follows. We replace the function S L with a relation S, and allow a situation to have zero or more successors. We add an argument to Happens, Initiates, Terminates, and Releases specifying the successor situation. It is important to add the successor situation to Initiates, Terminates, and Releases to treat concurrent events with cumulative and canceling effects (see Section 6.2).
The language has the constant S 0 denoting the initial situation, and the following predicates:
• S(s 1 , s 2 ): Situation s 2 is a successor of situation s 1 .
• Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ): Event e occurs between situation s 1 and situation s 2 .
• Initiates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ): If event e occurs between situation s 1 and situation s 2 , then fluent f will be true and not released from the commonsense law of inertia at s 2 .
• Terminates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ): If event e occurs between situation s 1 and situation s 2 , then fluent f will be false and not released from the commonsense law of inertia at s 2 .
• Releases(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ): If event e occurs between situation s 1 and situation s 2 , then fluent f will be released from the commonsense law of inertia at s 2 .
Let BDEC be the conjunction of the following axioms:
Axioms BDEC1 through BDEC3 are generalized Peano axioms along the lines of Schmidt (1960) and Clark and Tärnlund (1977) , which do not require each situation to have exactly one successor. BDEC3 is a second-order induction axiom similar to the one used by Reiter (1993) for the situation calculus. In any model of these axioms, situations form a tree whose root is S 0 .
4 Relationship of LDEC and BDEC
The relationship of LDEC and BDEC can be characterized precisely as follows. Let L be the conjunction of the following axioms:
L serves as a bridge between BDEC and LDEC. We can show that the conjunction of BDEC and L is logically equivalent to the conjunction of LDEC and L.
We first prove several lemmas.
Proof. Suppose LDEC ∧ L. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and s 1 and s 2 be arbitrary situations. We must show Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ) ∧ Initiates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ) → HoldsAt(f, s 2 ). Suppose
From (1) and L2, we have
From (2) and L3, we have Initiates L (e, f, s 1 ). From this, (3), and LDEC8, we have HoldsAt(f, s 2 ), as required.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1, except that ¬HoldsAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Terminates is substituted for Initiates, Terminates L is substituted for Initiates L , and LDEC9 is substituted for LDEC8.
Lemma 3. LDEC ∧ L BDEC10.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1, except that ReleasedAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Releases is substituted for Initiates, Releases L is substituted for Initiates L , and LDEC10 is substituted for LDEC8.
Proof. Suppose LDEC ∧ L. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and s 1 and s 2 be arbitrary situations. We must show Happens(e,
Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ) (4)
From (4) and L2, we have
From (5), L3, and L4, we have Initiates L (e, f, s 1 ) ∨ Terminates L (e, f, s 1 ). From this, (6), and LDEC11, we have ¬ReleasedAt(f, s 2 ), as required.
Now we proceed to the equivalence results.
Proof. Suppose BDEC ∧ L. LDEC1 follows from BDEC1 and L1. LDEC2 follows from BDEC2 and L1. LDEC3 follows from BDEC3 and L1. LDEC4 follows from BDEC4, L1, L2, and L4. LDEC5 follows from BDEC5, L1, L2, and L3. LDEC6 follows from BDEC6, L1, L2, L3, and L4. LDEC7 follows from BDEC7, L1, L2, and L5. LDEC8 follows from BDEC8, L2, and L3. LDEC9 follows from BDEC9, L2, and L4. LDEC10 follows from BDEC10, L2, and L5. LDEC11 follows from BDEC11, L2, L3, and L4. Therefore, LDEC.
BDEC1 follows from LDEC1 and L1. BDEC2 follows from LDEC2 and L1. BDEC3 follows from LDEC3 and L1. BDEC4 follows from LDEC4, L1, L2, and L4. BDEC5 follows from LDEC5, L1, L2, and L3. BDEC6 follows from LDEC6, L1, L2, L3, and L4. BDEC7 follows from LDEC7, L1, L2, and L5. BDEC8 follows from Lemma 1. BDEC9 follows from Lemma 2. BDEC10 follows from Lemma 3. BDEC11 follows from Lemma 4. BDEC12 follows from L1 and L2. Therefore, BDEC.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Relationship of BDEC and situation calculus
If BDEC is restricted appropriately, we can show that it is equivalent to the situation calculus. We restrict BDEC as follows:
1. We eliminate the ability to release fluents from the commonsense law of inertia.
2. We require a unique successor of an event.
3. We disallow multiple events between situations.
4. We require Initiates and Terminates to be independent of the successor.
Let BDECS be the conjunction of the following axioms:
Axioms BDECS1 through BDECS8 are obtained by removing mention of the predicates ReleasedAt and Releases from BDEC. Axioms BDECS9 and BDECS10 require a unique successor of an event. Axiom BDECS11 disallows multiple events between situations. Axioms BDECS12 and BDECS13 require Initiates and Terminates to be independent of the successor.
We use a version of the situation calculus similar to that of Kowalski and Sadri (1997) . Let SC be the conjunction of the following axioms:
Let S be the conjunction of the following axioms: S1. S(s 1 , s 2 ) ↔ ∃e (Do(e, s 1 ) = s 2 ) S2. Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ) ↔ Do(e, s 1 ) = s 2 S3. Initiates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ) ↔ Initiates S (e, f, s 1 ) S4. Terminates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ) ↔ Terminates S (e, f, s 1 ) S serves as a bridge between BDECS and S. We can show that the conjunction of BDECS and S is logically equivalent to the conjunction of SC and S.
We start by proving a number of lemmas.
Lemma 5. BDECS ∧ S SC2.
Proof. Suppose BDECS ∧ S. Let e 1 and e 2 be arbitrary events and s 1 and s 2 be arbitrary situations. We must show Do(e 1 , s 1 ) = Do(e 2 , s 2 ) → e 1 = e 2 ∧ s 1 = s 2 . Suppose
Do(e 1 , s 1 ) = Do(e 2 , s 2 )
Let s 3 = Do(e 1 , s 1 ). From this and S2, we have
From s 3 = Do(e 1 , s 1 ), (7), and S2, we have
Happens(e 2 , s 2 , s 3 )
From (8) and BDECS8, we have
From (9) and BDECS8, we have
From this, (10), and BDECS2, we have s 1 = s 2 , as required. From this, (8), (9), and BDECS11, we have e 1 = e 2 , as required.
Lemma 6. BDECS ∧ S SC3.
Proof. Suppose BDECS ∧ S. Let P be an arbitrary predicate. We must show (P(S 0 ) ∧ ∀e, s (P(s) → P(Do(e, s)))) → ∀s P(s). Suppose
We can show
To see this, let s 1 and s 2 be arbitrary situations. Suppose
From (15) and S1, we have Do(E, s 1 ) = s 2 for some E. From this, (16), and (13), we have P(s 2 ), as required.
From (12), (14), and BDECS3, we have ∀s P(s), as required.
Lemma 7. BDECS ∧ S SC4.
Proof. Suppose BDECS ∧ S. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and s 1 be an arbitrary situation. We must show HoldsAt(f, s 1 ) ∧ ¬Terminates S (e, f, s 1 ) → HoldsAt(f, Do(e, s 1 )). Suppose
Let s 2 = Do(e, s 1 ). From this and S1, we have
From s 2 = Do(e, s 1 ) and S2, we have Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ). From this and BDECS11, we have
From (18) Lemma 8. BDECS ∧ S SC5.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 7, except that ¬HoldsAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Initiates S is substituted for Terminates S , Initiates is substituted for Terminates, and BDECS5 is substituted for BDECS4.
Lemma 9. BDECS ∧ S SC6.
Proof. Suppose BDECS ∧ S. Let e be an arbitrary event, f be an arbitrary fluent, and s 1 be an arbitrary situation. We must show Initiates S (e, f, s 1 ) → HoldsAt(f, Do(e, s 1 )). Suppose
Let s 2 = Do(e, s 1 ). From this and S2, we have
Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 )
From (21) and S3, we have Initiates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 ). From this, (22), and BDECS6, we have HoldsAt(f, s 2 ). From this and s 2 = Do(e, s 1 ), we have HoldsAt(f, Do(e, s 1 )), as required.
Lemma 10. BDECS ∧ S SC7.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 9, except that ¬HoldsAt is substituted for HoldsAt, Terminates S is substituted for Initiates S , Terminates is substituted for Initiates, and BDECS7 is substituted for BDECS6.
Lemma 11. SC ∧ S BDECS2.
Proof. Suppose SC ∧ S. Let s 1 , s 2 , and s be arbitrary situations. We must show S(s 1 , s) ∧ S(s 2 , s) → s 1 = s 2 . Suppose S(s 1 , s) ∧ S(s 2 , s). From this and S1, we have Do(E 1 , s 1 ) = Do(E 2 , s 2 ) for some E 1 and E 2 . From this and SC2, we have s 1 = s 2 , as required.
Proof. Suppose SC ∧ S. Let P be an arbitrary predicate. We must show (P (S 0 ) ∧ ∀s 1 , s 2 (S(s 1 , s 2 ) ∧ P (s 1 ) → P (s 2 ))) → ∀s P (s). Suppose
To see this, let e be an arbitrary event and s be an arbitrary situation. Suppose
Let s 3 = Do(e, s). From this and S1, we have S(s, s 3 ). From this, (26), and (24), we have P(s 3 ). From this and s 3 = Do(e, s), we have P(Do(e, s)), as required.
From (23), (25), and SC3, we have ∀s P (s), as required.
Lemma 13. SC ∧ S BDECS4.
Proof. Suppose SC ∧ S. Let f be an arbitrary fluent and s 1 and s 2 be arbitrary situations. We must show S(s 1 , s 2 )∧HoldsAt(f, s 1 )∧¬∃e (Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 )∧Terminates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 )) → HoldsAt(f, s 2 ). Suppose
From (29), we have
Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ) → ¬Terminates(e, f, s 1 , s 2 )
From (27) and S1, we have
for some E. 
Corollary 2. BDECS ∧ S is logically equivalent to SC ∧ S.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
6 Commonsense reasoning problems BDEC can be used to reason about (1) hypothetical events as in the situation calculus, and (2) phenomena of action and change as in the event calculus. In this section, we show how BDEC can be used to perform commonsense reasoning about three scenarios: the hypothetical Yale shooting scenario, the soup bowl scenario, and the reactive cat scenario.
Hypothetical Yale shooting scenario
Van Belleghem, Denecker, and De Schreye (1997) describe the following problem of hypothetical reasoning, which is based on the Yale shooting scenario (Hanks & McDermott, 1987) .
A turkey, which was initially alive, was shot by a person. It is not known whether the gun was loaded. But it is known that, if the person had waited instead of shooting, then the gun would have been loaded afterward. The problem is to infer that the gun was initially loaded, and that the turkey died. Van Belleghem et al. argue that this problem can be solved using the situation calculus, but not by the event calculus. We show how BDEC can be used to solve this problem. We use a domain theory similar to that of Shanahan (1997, pp. 322-323) . We have three events, Load, Shoot, and Wait, and two fluents, Alive and Loaded. If a gun is loaded, then it will be loaded:
If a gun is loaded and the gun is shot, then the victim will no longer be alive:
If a gun is shot, then it will no longer be loaded:
We consider the following narrative. The victim is initially alive:
The gun is shot between situation S 0 and situation S 1 :
We add the following hypothetical information. If the person had waited between situation S 0 and situation S 2 , then the gun would have been loaded at S 2 :
The events and fluents are distinct:
Fluents are never released from the commonsense law of inertia:
We can then show that the gun was loaded at S 0 and that the victim was dead at S 1 . Just as in the classical logic event calculus, we use the nonmonotonic method of circumscription (Lifschitz, 1994; McCarthy, 1980) for default reasoning about time. We circumscribe Initiates, Terminates, and Releases to minimize unexpected effects of events, and we circumscribe Happens to minimize unexpected events. Proof. From CIRC[Σ; Initiates, Terminates, Releases] and Propositions 2 and 14 of Lifschitz (1994) reducing circumscription to predicate completion and reducing parallel circumscription to basic circumscription, we have
From CIRC[∆; Happens] and Proposition 2 of Lifschitz, we have
Seeking a contradiction, suppose that
From (50), (53), (45), and (47), we have ¬∃e (Happens(e, S 0 , S 2 )∧Initiates(e, Loaded, S 0 , S 2 )). From this, S(S 0 , S 2 ) (which follows from (53) and BDEC12), (54), (49), and BDEC5, we have ¬HoldsAt(Loaded, S 2 ), which contradicts (44). Therefore, HoldsAt(Loaded, S 0 ). From this and (51), we have Terminates(Shoot, Alive, S 0 , S 1 ). From this, Happens(Shoot, S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (53)), and BDEC9, we have ¬HoldsAt(Alive, S 1 ). Gelfond, Lifschitz, and Rabinov (1991) describe the following soup bowl scenario. A person is trying to lift a bowl of soup. The problem is to infer that, if the person lifts the bowl with one hand, then the soup spills, whereas, if the person lifts the bowl with both hands, then the soup does not spill. Miller and Shanahan (2002, pp. 460-461) have formalized this problem in the classical logic event calculus. We show that their formalization works in BDEC as well. By using BDEC, we are able to consider two hypothetical alternatives.
Soup bowl scenario
If the bowl is lifted with both hands, then it will be raised:
If the bowl is only lifted with one hand, then it will be spilled:
Initially, the bowl is not raised and not spilled:
We consider two alternatives. The first alternative is that the bowl is lifted with both hands:
We can show that the bowl will be raised and not spilled. The second alternative is that the bowl is lifted with the right hand:
We can show that the bowl will be spilled and not raised. The events and fluents are distinct:
Situations S 1 and S 2 are distinct:
Fluents are never released from the commonsense law of inertia: 
Proof. From CIRC[Σ; Initiates, Terminates, Releases] and Propositions 2 and 14 of Lifschitz (1994) , we have
From Happens(LiftLeft, S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (70)) and (67), we have Initiates(LiftRight, Raised, S 0 , S 1 ). From this, Happens(LiftRight, S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (70)), and BDEC8, we have HoldsAt(Raised, S 1 ).
From (67), (70), (63), (64), and (65), we have ¬∃e (Happens(e, S 0 , S 1 ) ∧ Initiates(e, Spilled, S 0 , S 1 )). From this, S(S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (70) and BDEC12), (59), (66), and BDEC5, we have ¬HoldsAt(Spilled, S 1 ) From ¬Happens(LiftLeft, S 0 , S 2 ) (which follows from (70), (63), and (65)), and (67), we have Initiates(LiftRight, Spilled, S 0 , S 2 ). From this, Happens(LiftRight, S 0 , S 2 ) (which follows from (70)), and BDEC8, we have HoldsAt(Spilled, S 2 )
From (67), (70), (63), (64), and (65), we have ¬∃e (Happens(e, S 0 , S 2 ) ∧ Initiates(e, Raised, S 0 , S 2 )). From this, S(S 0 , S 2 ) (which follows from (70) and BDEC12), (58), (66), and BDEC5, we have ¬HoldsAt(Raised, S 2 ).
Reactive cat scenario
Consider a cat that eats food whenever food is present. If food is present at situation s 1 , then the food is eaten between s 1 and every successor situation s 2 of s 1 :
If the food is eaten, then it will no longer be present:
A situation has at most one actual successor:
An event actually occurs in a situation if and only if the event occurs between the situation and some actual situation:
ActuallyHappens(e, s 1 ) ↔ ∃s 2 (Happens(e, s 1 , s 2 ) ∧ Actual(s 2 ))
Consider again the hypothetical Yale shooting scenario. We need only specify that S 1 is an actual situation:
From this, S(S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (53) and BDEC12), and (79), we have Actual(S 0 ). From S(S 0 , S 1 ), S(S 0 , S 2 ) (which follows from (53) and BDEC12), (82), and (80), we have ¬Actual(S 2 ). From this, (53), and (81), we have ¬ActuallyHappens(Wait, S 0 ). From Happens(Shoot, S 0 , S 1 ) (which follows from (53)), (82), and (81), we have ActuallyHappens(Shoot, S 0 ).
Related work
The main difference between BDEC and other proposals for combining the event calculus and situation calculus is that BDEC considers situations and timepoints to be one and the same. Other proposals define situations differently from timepoints. Provetti (1996) proposes a hybrid of the event calculus and the situation calculus. Every timepoint is associated with a situation, but not every situation is associated with a timepoint. Every timepoint in the linear timeline of the event calculus corresponds to the root of a tree of hypothetical situations in the situation calculus. Unlike BDEC, the formalism does not handle hypothetical reasoning about concurrent actions. Kowalski and Sadri (1997) propose a version of the event calculus with branching time and situations. Unlike BDEC, this variant disallows concurrent events, and it identifies timepoints with both situations and transitions between situations. Van Belleghem, Denecker, and De Schreye (1997) propose a formalism that extends both the event calculus and the situation calculus. They start with a version of the event calculus with the linear time axiom T 1 < T 2 ∨ T 1 = T 2 ∨ T 2 < T 1 . They then replace this axiom with the branching time axiom (T 1 < T 3 ∧ T 2 < T 3 ) → (T 1 < T 2 ∨ T 1 = T 2 ∨ T 2 < T 1 ). They then define a situation started by an event at timepoint T 1 as the set of timepoints T 2 after T 1 such that there are no events between T 1 and T 2 . Unlike BDEC, this formalism disallows concurrent events, and defines situations as sets of timepoints. Lévy and Quantz (1998) propose an extension of the event calculus in which a situation argument is added to every event calculus predicate, and the event calculus axioms are modified accordingly. This formalism does not have a successor relation between situations. Situations are instead related to one another by a predicate Equal until(s 1 , s 2 , t), which represents that situations s 1 and s 2 are equal until time t.
The primary difference between BDEC and the situation calculus is that BDEC separates the do function into the two predicates S and Happens. In Section 5, we specify the precise relationship between BDEC and the situation calculus. We show that, if BDEC is appropriately restricted, it is equivalent to the situation calculus.
BDEC is different from the formulation of the situation calculus of Reiter and colleagues (Lin & Reiter, 1994; Pinto, 1994 Pinto, , 1998 Pirri & Reiter, 1999; Reiter, 1991 Reiter, , 1993 Reiter, , 2001 ). Pirri and Reiter (1999) provide the following foundational axioms for the situation calculus:
In any model of these axioms, every situation has a successor for every element of the action domain. In any model of BDEC, if an event occurs between situation s 1 and s 2 , then s 1 has s 2 as a successor (see axiom BDEC12). Whereas BDEC allows more than one event between two situations, the situation calculus of Reiter et al. does not. In BDEC, we can write
is inconsistent with axiom (83). Multiple events between situations are also ruled out by Davis's (1994) axiom result(S1, EA, S2) ∧ result(S1, EB, S2) → EA = EB, and by axiom BDECS11 of our restricted version of BDEC.
Based on previous proposals (Schubert, 1990; Gelfond et al., 1991; Pinto, 1994; Lin & Shoham, 1995) , Reiter (1996) adds concurrent actions to the situation calculus by defining a concurrent action as a set of simple actions, and redefining do to work on concurrent actions. This enables representation of multiple events between situations. One can write S 1 = do({A 1 , A 2 }, S 0 ). Whereas BDEC allows zero events between two situations, Reiter requires a concurrent action to contain at least one simple action. (Zero actions between situations can be simulated in the situation calculus using an action that has no effects.) BDEC is different from McCarthy's (1997 McCarthy's ( , 2002 formulation of the situation calculus with concurrent events and narratives. In this formulation, the predicate Occurs(e, s) represents that event e occurs in situation s, the function Next(s) represents the next situation after s, and the function Result(e, s) represents the situation that results from e occurring in situation s. These are related via the axiom Occurs(e, s) → Next(s) = Result(e, s)
We can represent that two events occur in S 0 : Occurs(E 1 , S 0 ) ∧ Occurs(E 2 , S 0 ) ∧ E 1 = E 2 . From this and (87), we have Next(S 0 ) = Result(E 1 , S 0 ) and Next(S 0 ) = Result(E 2 , S 0 ). Thus as in BDEC, we can have distinct events E 1 and E 2 between two situations:
But we cannot then represent hypothetical events E 1 and E 3 that occur between S 0 and some other situation S 2 :
S 2 = Result(E 1 , S 0 ) (89) S 2 = Result(E 3 , S 0 ) (90)
The formulas (89) and (91) are inconsistent with (88). To allow hypothetical reasoning, McCarthy (1997) adds a narrative argument to Occurs, and uses contexts (Guha, 1992; McCarthy, 1993) to reason with Occurs(e, s) inside a narrative. We rewrite (87) as Occurs(e, s, n) → Next(s, n) = Result(e, s, n) and use lifting formulas such as SpecializeNarrative(n, c , c) ∧ Ist(c , Occurs(e, s)) → Ist(c, Occurs(e, s, n)). Nossum and Thielscher (1999) propose to use contexts in the event calculus.
Conclusions
We introduced BDEC, a branching time discrete version of the classical logic event calculus. We proved that a restricted version of BDEC is equivalent to the situation calculus. BDEC is useful for commonsense reasoning about hypothetical events as well as other phenomena of action and change. A catalog of commonsense phenomena treated by the classical logic event calculus is provided by Mueller (2006a) .
Some areas for further work are the following:
• BDEC allows two identical sets of event occurrences to lead to two different situations. For example, E 1 and E 2 could lead from S 0 to S 1 , and E 1 and E 2 could also lead from S 0 to a situation S 2 distinct from S 1 . The following axiom to rule this out could be added: (∀e (Happens(e, s, s 1 ) ↔ Happens(e, s, s 2 ))) → s 1 = s 2 .
• To allow reasoning about gradual change, the Trajectory and AntiTrajectory predicates (Miller & Shanahan, 2002) could be added to BDEC. This requires definition of the distance between two situations along a path.
